



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

~~**Top Secret**~~

OCPAS/C16

CY# 285

# **National Intelligence Daily**

*Thursday  
5 May 1983*

~~**Top Secret**~~

CPAS NID 83-106JX

5 May 1983

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**PLO-SYRIA-JORDAN: Arafat's Balancing Act**

*PLO leader Arafat's restoration of closer ties with Syria reduces the chances of his reaching agreement with King Hussein on a joint strategy toward peace negotiations.* [redacted]

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Syrian media and PLO spokesmen are stressing that the meeting on Tuesday between Arafat and President Assad marks a significant improvement in relations. [redacted]

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Hussein, meanwhile, intends to urge the PLO to join the peace process by imposing restrictions on the movement of West Bank Palestinians to the East Bank. A Jordanian official said on Tuesday that the restrictions probably would be put into effect within a few weeks. West Bank press reports are stating, however, that residents of that area already are having difficulty crossing the Jordan River bridges and obtaining work or study permits for the East Bank. [redacted]

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**Comment:** Arafat's inability to reach an agreement with Hussein left him with little leverage to fend off pressure from Syria and PLO radicals to improve relations with Damascus. Arafat's fear that Syria and Israel are heading for renewed fighting in Lebanon also encouraged him to seek a rapprochement with Syria. [redacted]

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The underlying animosity between Arafat and the Syrians is likely to persist. Arafat, however, now will be likely to try to align his policies on the Middle East peace process more closely with those of Syria. Although this will make it more difficult for Arafat to bridge the gap between his position and that of Hussein, the PLO chief will continue to support the concept of a negotiated solution of the Palestinian issue. [redacted]

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The King, by imposing restrictions on West Bank Palestinians, is primarily interested in protecting Jordan's national security by limiting immigration into the East Bank. He probably also hopes, however, that West Bankers—who see their longstanding economic and family ties with Jordan slipping away—will put pressure on the PLO to reconsider its position. [redacted]

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**SURINAME: New Government Program**

*The government's new domestic and foreign policy plans announced on Sunday are moderate in tone and content.* [ ]

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The initiatives presented by Prime Minister Alibux emphasize social welfare and community development projects, an expanded economic infrastructure, and decentralized administration. Alibux said the government will try to improve relations with the Netherlands, strengthen relations with some other countries, and expand Suriname's participation in international organizations. [ ]

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Army Commander Bouterse's speech on the same day reiterated many of Alibux's points but made heavy use of revolutionary rhetoric and condemned the Dutch. Bouterse also said the People's Militia will be controlled by the National Army. The US Embassy notes his remarks were less hostile toward the US than those made in similar gatherings in the past. [ ]

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**Comment:** The policy statement indicates Alibux's Nationalist Party has won the current round of political infighting. Mobilization Minister Sital's pro-Cuban party reportedly wanted to emphasize political action programs and to continue a hostile posture toward the Dutch. Placing the militia under Army control would substantially reduce Sital's potential power base, if in fact Bouterse can do so. [ ]

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Bouterse's rhetoric suggests, however, that he is unwilling to alienate Sital's party. The Surinamese leader's main goal is to retain power, and he apparently intends to cultivate all current sources of support. [ ]

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Alibux gave no indication how the government hopes to finance its ambitious program. Several of the proposed projects are in areas where Cuba has offered assistance, and they thus could provide Havana with an opportunity for an expanded role. [ ]

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The Prime Minister's party may hope an improvement in relations with The Hague will encourage the Dutch to renew their aid. The Dutch Government has reacted negatively to the regime's new program, however, and has indicated that conditions for the resumption of aid have not been met. [ ]

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**NICARAGUA-HONDURAS-COSTA RICA: Sandinista Protests**

*The Sandinistas appear to be exaggerating claims of fighting along the Honduran border while taking a softer line toward Costa Rica about insurgent activity in the south.* [ ]

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Nicaragua asserts that insurgents have launched a new invasion from Honduras resulting in the heaviest fighting in recent months. Protests to the US and Honduras allege 1,000 Honduran Army troops are supporting the insurgent attacks in Nueva Segovia Department through incursions and artillery fire. [ ]

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A protest yesterday to Costa Rica claimed that insurgents attacked two border posts in southern Nicaragua earlier this week, and then retreated across the border. The Costa Rican press reported that on Sunday Eden Pastora's forces had briefly seized the border town of El Castillo. [ ]

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Nicaragua requested that Costa Rica take measures to prevent attacks but did not accuse it of violating its pledge of neutrality. Meanwhile, the Costa Ricans have sent statements to the OAS and the UN indicating willingness to accept international inspection of the border. [ ]

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**Comment:** Nicaragua appears to be increasing its rhetoric to influence international and US opinion, to lay the groundwork for bringing its case to the UN, and to justify extending the national state of emergency, which is about to expire. [ ]

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Scattered attacks by the anti-Sandinistas are continuing in the northwest, but they apparently are not large scale. Honduran troops along the entire border number only some 500 and are unlikely to be involved in the fighting. [ ]

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In its dealings with Costa Rica, Nicaragua probably will continue its combination of displays of public restraint and aggressive military patrolling. The renewal of the peace force idea, however, underscores Costa Rica's increasing concern over Nicaraguan border incursions. San Jose fears the incursions will increase as a result of Pastora's activities. [ ]

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**IRAN-USSR: Deteriorating Relations**

*Iran's expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats and advisers and the banning of the Tudeh Communist Party yesterday bring relations to their lowest level since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power.* [ ]

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The Foreign Ministry has accused the Soviets of "blatant interference" in Iran's internal affairs. Moscow has not yet reacted publicly to the expulsions or the ban, but the Soviet-controlled National Voice of Iran broadcast condemnations of the crackdown without attacking Khomeini. [ ]

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Iranian prosecutors charge that Soviet Embassy officers ordered Tudeh to commit economic sabotage, infiltrate military and security forces, and "misappropriate" arms and ammunition for use against the regime. Tehran also has attacked Moscow for its arms sales to Baghdad, its operations in Afghanistan, and its propaganda calling for Iranian workers to oppose government policies. [ ]

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On Sunday the regime staged a televised confession by Tudeh leader Kianuri, posing him in front of a banner proclaiming that the USSR is worse than the US and the UK. Kianuri implied he expects to be executed. [ ]

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The Tudeh leaders face public trial later this month, and purges of Tudeh members and sympathizers are under way. Tehran is warning citizens not to interfere with the arrests or try to take action themselves. Khomeini issued a statement yesterday that commended the crackdown on Tudeh and linked it to earlier moves against opposition elements, but did not refer to the ouster of Soviet diplomats. [ ]

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**Comment:** A break in relations by either side is unlikely but cannot be ruled out. The anti-Soviet campaign is being encouraged by conservative clerical factions to weaken rivals who advocate radical domestic policies and good relations with the USSR. [ ]

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Tehran may demand withdrawal of some of the estimated 2,000 Soviet economic and technical advisers, who are located primarily in Tehran and Esfahan, or take other steps against the Soviets. Its warning to the population suggests the regime is concerned its campaign may provoke violence against Soviet personnel in Iran. [ ]

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Moscow almost certainly will issue a formal protest and also may expel Iranian diplomats. Its response to other recent ousters of Soviets abroad has been restrained, however, and it probably will take a more long-range view in this case. In reaction to the ban on Tudeh, the Soviets may accuse the Iranian revolution of turning to the right without criticizing Khomeini. [ ]

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**CEMA: Summit Postponed Again**

*A meeting of Soviet and East European party economic secretaries in Moscow last week failed to set a date or an agenda for a CEMA summit.* [ ]

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A Romanian diplomat says differences among the CEMA members could not be resolved at the political level and would have to be addressed again at the experts' level, issue by issue. The Soviets reportedly refused to consider Romania's call for increased supplies of Soviet oil. Other major disagreements involved mechanisms proposed for improving economic coordination within CEMA. [ ]

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A senior Soviet economist, who is a specialist on CEMA, has told the British Ambassador the differences are unlikely to be solved in time for a summit to be held before early next year. [ ]

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**Comment:** The USSR wants to limit its obligations to provide the East Europeans with oil and other raw materials at preferential prices. At the same time, however, it wants to ensure that the East European economies remain strong enough to maintain political stability. In addition, the Soviets are concerned about the economic dependence of their East European allies on the West. [ ]

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The continued delay in agreeing on an agenda reflects resistance—especially from Romania and Hungary—to Moscow's efforts to establish closer coordination within CEMA and tighter Soviet control. The Soviets want to accelerate integration of planning and production in order to ensure more efficient investment and to reduce duplication of production. Most of the East Europeans want trade concessions from the USSR, but Moscow apparently has not tried to attain its broader aims by being more responsive on trade. [ ]

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
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**CHINA-FRANCE: Possible Nuclear Agreement**

Chinese officials claim that Beijing has agreed in principle to buy two 900-megawatt nuclear power reactors from France for the Guangdong nuclear project and that an announcement to this effect will be made during French President Mitterrand's current visit to China. Beijing canceled a nearly identical agreement with France in 1979 because of budget cutbacks. A Chinese official involved in the deal says China has no plans for US participation in the project at this time. A Chinese delegation, however, still intends to visit Washington this summer to continue discussing US requirements for licensing nuclear exports to China.

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**Comment:** Beijing may try to use an agreement with Paris to induce Washington to ease its conditions on nuclear exports to China. If the Sino-US talks make any progress, the Chinese may ask the French to lower their price. The conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement with the US could lead Beijing to renege on previous agreements with France because the Chinese prefer US nuclear technology.

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**CHINA-TAIWAN: Maneuvering Over Bank Membership**

An article published in *People's Daily* on Tuesday—the eve of the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank—asserts Taiwan is unqualified for membership because it is not a member of the UN or its specialized agencies as required by the Bank's charter. A senior Chinese diplomat, however, says Beijing would permit private banks on Taiwan to maintain business ties with the Bank after China joins. Taiwan does not claim to represent all of China in the Bank and remains willing to allow Beijing to join while maintaining its own seat. Taipei has sent a large delegation to the meeting to lobby for its case.

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**Comment:** China's willingness to allow Taiwan to retain a channel to the Bank seems designed to induce the US to take the initiative in finding a solution. Japan and other key members also appear to be waiting for the US to propose a compromise. Although Taiwan will try to retain its membership, it has broadly hinted it will accept a change in the name of its representation. It probably would not accept unofficial status but would try to defer action indefinitely, hoping the risk of a US cutoff of support to the Bank will aid its cause.

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Political, labor, and religious leaders have rejected the government's "final" report aimed at justifying repressive tactics used to combat terrorism in the late 1970s. Demonstrators have protested against the document and against the government's decision to absolve lower ranking officials of wrongdoing. At least two high-level police officials have been physically attacked.

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**Comment:** The human rights issue is unlikely to endanger the transition to civilian rule. Military leaders cannot fully placate either side, however, and they apparently intend to temporize until elections are held. As a result, demonstrations probably will continue and, unless the government issues a formal amnesty for security personnel or takes other measures to allay the fears of the military, rightwing violence will increase.

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**GHANA: Student Demonstrations**

The US Embassy reports that students in Accra are calling for nationwide demonstrations to register popular dissatisfaction with Head of State Rawlings's regime. They do not expect strong opposition from police or the Army. In two other cities students and workers recently protested deteriorating economic conditions and demanded that the regime give way to an interim civilian government.

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**Comment:** Public discontent with the regime is intensifying as a result of food shortages and increases in prices of petroleum and other products. The coverup of a government report implicating Rawlings's leading leftist adviser in the murder of moderates is adding to the regime's unpopularity. Although the student unrest is unlikely to bring down the government, it could encourage disgruntled military personnel or dissidents to move against Rawlings.

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